At the close of the first essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche states that "From now on, all disciplines [philology, history, conventional philosophy, physiology, medical science], have to prepare the future task of the philosopher: this task being understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the hierarchy of values" (GM.1.17).
This echoes the thinking in Daybreak (453), where he states: "To construct anew the laws of life and action - for this task our sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology and solitude are not yet sufficiently sure of themselves: and it is from them that the foundation stones of new ideals (if not the ideals themselves) must come. So it is that, according to our taste and talent, we live in an existence which is either a prelude or a postlude, and the best we can do in this interregnum is to be as far as possible our own reges and found little experimental states. We are experiments: let us also want to be them!"
And in Zarathustra we find: "Here I sit and wait, old shattered law-tables around me and also new, half-written law-tables. When will my hour come? - the hour of my down-going, my descent: for I want to go to men once more" (TSZ.111.12).
The first, obvious thing to note, is that Nietzsche does not think, in spite of his enormously high estimation of TSZ, that this task has been accomplished.
Now, on the one hand, Nietzsche recognises that much relevant knowledge is still needed before a rigorous and substantial revaluation can take place. On the other hand, he recognises that the new values will not, of themselves, simply emerge as the result of any straightforward knowledge acquisition. This desired knowledge will be required to provide the "foundation stones" for new, life-affirming values; but will be unsuited to advance a normative aspect. For this, the "genuine philosopher" is required, to make a creative, but informed leap, given the constraints and possibilities that will be offered by the acquired relevant knowledge.
Several important questions are implied in this outlook. What are the most significant?
Clearly, Nietzsche wants the creation of new values to be "grounded" in certain facts to be uncovered by various sciences. One assumes these future findings would not themselves necessitate the adoption or promotion of any specific value system (though perhaps this assumption is actually unwarranted? Can we a priori rule it out?), but they will, ideally, outline various plausible trajectories.
What sort of facts does Nietzsche have in mind here? Will any number of facts ever be enough? You also raise the question of who the "revaluation" is supposed to apply to, and where the "philosopher of the future" is, and is not, supposed to function? Is this a social or even political issue, or is it to be confined to the "hermits and hermits in pairs" that Zarathustra designates as his rightful audience (at times)?
Nietzsche says explicitly in WP that a "revaluation" can only arise among those who are suffering from the old values. In this light, it seems far fetched to think that the general population has much to gain from a Nietzschean critique.
At times Nietzsche talks as if some "Lycurgus" figure is his highest hope for future humanity. This makes no Nietzschean sense at all, for several fairly obvious reasons. If any individuals deserve the title of "philosopher" in Nietzsche's idiosyncratic sense of the term (BGE.211), surely it's people like Paul, Luther, and Rousseau? All people who Nietzsche detests.
Another interpretation would say that the "revaluation" is indeed only for "hermits and hermits in pairs", and that all suggestions to the contrary are purely rhetorical. Here one could cite GS.255 as supporting evidence.
At the close of the first essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche states that "From now on, all disciplines [philology, history, conventional philosophy, physiology, medical science], have to prepare the future task of the philosopher: this task being understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the hierarchy of values" (GM.1.17).
ReplyDeleteThis echoes the thinking in Daybreak (453), where he states: "To construct anew the laws of life and action - for this task our sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology and solitude are not yet sufficiently sure of themselves: and it is from them that the foundation stones of new ideals (if not the ideals themselves) must come. So it is that, according to our taste and talent, we live in an existence which is either a prelude or a postlude, and the best we can do in this interregnum is to be as far as possible our own reges and found little experimental states. We are experiments: let us also want to be them!"
And in Zarathustra we find: "Here I sit and wait, old shattered law-tables around me and also new, half-written law-tables. When will my hour come? - the hour of my down-going, my descent: for I want to go to men once more" (TSZ.111.12).
The first, obvious thing to note, is that Nietzsche does not think, in spite of his enormously high estimation of TSZ, that this task has been accomplished.
Now, on the one hand, Nietzsche recognises that much relevant knowledge is still needed before a rigorous and substantial revaluation can take place. On the other hand, he recognises that the new values will not, of themselves, simply emerge as the result of any straightforward knowledge acquisition. This desired knowledge will be required to provide the "foundation stones" for new, life-affirming values; but will be unsuited to advance a normative aspect. For this, the "genuine philosopher" is required, to make a creative, but informed leap, given the constraints and possibilities that will be offered by the acquired relevant knowledge.
Several important questions are implied in this outlook. What are the most significant?
Clearly, Nietzsche wants the creation of new values to be "grounded" in certain facts to be uncovered by various sciences. One assumes these future findings would not themselves necessitate the adoption or promotion of any specific value system (though perhaps this assumption is actually unwarranted? Can we a priori rule it out?), but they will, ideally, outline various plausible trajectories.
ReplyDeleteWhat sort of facts does Nietzsche have in mind here? Will any number of facts ever be enough? You also raise the question of who the "revaluation" is supposed to apply to, and where the "philosopher of the future" is, and is not, supposed to function? Is this a social or even political issue, or is it to be confined to the "hermits and hermits in pairs" that Zarathustra designates as his rightful audience (at times)?
Nietzsche says explicitly in WP that a "revaluation" can only arise among those who are suffering from the old values. In this light, it seems far fetched to think that the general population has much to gain from a Nietzschean critique.
At times Nietzsche talks as if some "Lycurgus" figure is his highest hope for future humanity. This makes no Nietzschean sense at all, for several fairly obvious reasons. If any individuals deserve the title of "philosopher" in Nietzsche's idiosyncratic sense of the term (BGE.211), surely it's people like Paul, Luther, and Rousseau? All people who Nietzsche detests.
Another interpretation would say that the "revaluation" is indeed only for "hermits and hermits in pairs", and that all suggestions to the contrary are purely rhetorical. Here one could cite GS.255 as supporting evidence.
Thoughts?